Masthead Logo

Faculty Scholarship

digitalcommons.nyls.edu
Articles & Chapters

1994

Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Understanding the
Sanist and Pretextual Bases of Mental Disability
Law
Michael L. Perlin
New York Law School, michael.perlin@nyls.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/fac_articles_chapters
Part of the Disability Law Commons, Law and Psychology Commons, and the Law and Society
Commons
Recommended Citation
Perlin, Michael L., "Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Understanding the Sanist and Pretextual Bases of Mental Disability Law" (1994).
Articles & Chapters. 1235.
https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/fac_articles_chapters/1235

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Articles & Chapters by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@NYLS.

Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Understanding The
Sanist and Pretextual Bases of Mental
Disability Law
Michael L Perlin*
I.

INTRODUCrION

The articles in this Symposium teach several important lessons
about therapeutic jurisprudence. First, they demonstrate that therapeu-

tic jurisprudence is not simply an academic discipline by which law
professors can reinterpret doctrinal change. Nor is it a carefully articulated rationale by which treatment professionals can convince the
judiciary that it is appropriate to return to the days of the "hands
off" doctrine so as to insulate treatment decisions from judicial scrutiny.1 Rather, these articles show that therapeutic jurisprudence can
be a powerful method of illuminating the "real life" impact of statutes,2 court decisions,3 and administrative systems,4 the effects of

* Professor of Law, New York Law School. A.B., Rutgers University; J.D., Columbia
University School of Law. This article is adapted from remarks made at the Massachusetts
Dep't of Mental Health's Division of Forensic Mental Health's Annual Conference, in
Auburn, Massachusetts (May 28, 1992).
1. 1 MCHAEL L PERuN, MENTAL DiSABILITY LAW: CnWL AD CRmINAL § 1.03, at 56 (1989); see, e.g., Banning v. Looney, 213 F.2d 771 (10th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348
U.S. 854 (1954) ("Courts are without power to supervise prison administration or to interfere
with the ordinary prison rules or regulations"); Siegel v. Ragan, 180 F.2d 785, 788 (7th Ci.
1950).
2. See Joel Haycock, Speaking Truth to Power: Rights, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, and
Massachusetts Mental Health Law, 20 NEw ENo. . oN CRiM. & CIV. CoNFINEMENT 301
(1994).
3. See Richard Barnum & Thomas Grisso, Competency to Stand Trial in Juvenile Court
in Massachusetts: Issues in Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 20 NEw ENO. L ON CRIM. & Civ.
CoNmInEMNT 321 (1994).

4. See Ira K. Packer, The Court Clinic System in Massachusetts: A Therapeutic Ap-
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relationships between forensic mental health professionals and the
mentally disabled persons they are evaluating,' as well as lawyering
practices.6 Not coincidentally, David Wexler puts forth precisely this

vision in the preface to his first collection of essays, Therapeutic
Jurisprudence:The Law as a Therapeutic Agent!
Second, these articles tellingly reveal that therapeutic jurispru-

dence principles can be applied to a myriad of legal issues confronting mentally disabled persons. Such issues include the ultimate im-

pact of court clinical evaluations,8 the special problems faced in cases involving mentally disabled juveniles charged with crimes,9 the
appropriate role of counsel in the involuntary civil commitment process, 10 and the actual impact of an obscure financial recoupment
statute on the liberty rights of institutionalized mental patients." Im-

portantly, most of these topics have been the focus of astonishingly
little scholarly attention or litigation. 2
Third, therapeutic jurisprudence can be a powerful tool for studying mental health systems. 3 Although the papers focus almost exclu-

proach vs. a Rights-Oriented Approach, 20 NEW ENo. J. ON CRIM. & CIv. CONFINEMENT
291 (1994).
5. See Kathy Faulkner Yates, Therapeutic Issues Associated With Confidentiality and
Informed Consent in Forensic Evaluations, 20 NEW ENO. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT
345 (1994).
6. See Joel Haycock et al., Mediating the Gap: Thinking About Alternatives to the Current Practice of Civil Commitment, 20 NEW ENO. J. ON CRim. & Civ. CONFINmmENT 265
(1994).
7. David B. Wexler, An Introduction to Therapeutic Jurisprudence, in THERAPETIC
JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A THERAPEUTIC AGENT 3 (David B. Wexler ed., 1990)
[hereinafter TJ]; David B. Wexler, An Orientation to Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 20 NEW
ENG. J. ON CRIM. & Clv. CONFINEMENT 259 (1994) [hereinafter Wexler, Orientation].
8. See Packer, supra note 4.
9. See Barnum & Grisso, supra note 3.
10. See Haycock et al., supra note 6.
11. See Haycock, supra note 2.
12. I do not believe that this is coincidental. In a work-in-progress, Deborah Dorfman
and I argue that scholars on all points of the political spectrum continue to ignore important
developments in mental disability law jurisprudence as a reflection of the way that the legal
problems of mentally disabled persons are ignored by society. See Michael L. Perlin &
Deborah A. Dorfman, The Invisible Renaissance of Mental Disability Law Scholarship: A
Case Study in Subordination (manuscript-in-progress, on file with authors).
13. For recent important systems-based studies of mental disability law, see Ingo Keilitz
& Ronald Roesch, Improving Justice and Mental Health Systems Interactions: In Search of a
New Paradigm 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 5 (1992); Pamela Casey et al, Toward an Agenda
for Reform of Justice and Mental Health Systems Interactions, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 107
(1992).
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sively on Massachusetts-specific questions, 14 the analyses and conclusions are generally applicable to parallel situations in other jurisdictions."
As discussed below, these papers demonstrate how therapeutic
jurisprudence functions as a vital, interpretive tool through which
mental disability law can be studied.16 The papers are most valuable,
however, for their explicit and implicit illustration of three collateral
points that must be evaluated in any therapeutic jurisprudence analysis. Wexler has stressed one of these points in his recent work. I
have begun turning my attention to the second point in other essays.
The third point is just beginning to be explored in therapeutic jurisprudence literature.
First, these papers acknowledge the importance (and in some

cases the primacy) of civil libertarian interests, while reminding us
that justice must remain the primary focus of the resolution of any
forensic mental health issue. Although Professor Wexler has stressed
this point on numerous occasions," it is a point sometimes in danger of being ignored or trivialized if therapeutic jurisprudence is
(incorrectly) viewed as merely a fancy rearticulation of what Nicholas
Kittrie called the "therapeutic state." 8 Joel Haycock makes this
point explicitly in this volume: 'Therapeutic jurisprudence represents
a means for redress, and for [legal] reform, and to that extent, it is
salutary and illuminating."19
Additionally, the papers remind the readers that therapeutic juris-

prudence analyses must be undertaken with a full awareness of the
impact of sanism ' and pretextuality1 on all aspects of the mental

14. Dr. Yates' paper is the sole exception to this statement.
15. See David Fmkelnan & Thomas Grisso, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: From Idea to
Application, 20 NEW ENO. L ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINmvENT 243 (1994).
16. See 1 PERLIN, supra note 1, § 1.05A, at 5 (Supp. 1993); Michael L. Perlin, What Is
Therapeutic Jurisprudence? 20 N.YL. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 623 (1993); Michael L. Perlin,
LAw AND MENTAL DIsAumLrr § 5.01 (1994).
17. Wexler, Orientation,supra note 7, at 259-60; David B. Wexler, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Changing Conceptions of Legal Scholarship, 11 BEHAVIORAL Sc. & L. 17
(1993); David B. Wexler, New Directions in Therapeutic Jurisprudence:Breaking the Bounds
of Mental Health Law Scholarship, 10 N.Y.L. ScH. .LHUM. RTS. 759 (1993) [hereinafter
Wexler, New Directions].
18. See generally NICHoLAs KITrRIE, THE RIGHT TO BE DFERENT. DEVIANCE AND
ENFORCED THERAPY (1971); Finkelman & Grisso, supra note 15, at 249.'
19. Haycock, supra note 2, at 318.
20. See Michael L. Perlin, On "Sanism", 46 SMU L. REV. 373 (1992); Michael L.
Perlin & Deborah A. Dorfman, Sanism, Social Science, and the Development of Mental
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disability law system. Further, we are reminded that therapeutic jurisprudence can be an effective and dramatic tool for ferreting out
sanism and pretexts by judges, legislators, administrators and coun-

sel.'
Finally, the essays point out a potentially serious gap in the
therapeutic jurisprudence methodology recognized by John
Petrilla-namely, its failure to explicitly incorporate the perspective
of both the voluntary and involuntary consumer of mental health
services in crafting a therapeutic jurisprudence perspective.'S Here,

Haycock states that "[t]he success of therapeutic jurisprudence will
depend in part on the degree to which it empowers the objects of

therapeutic and judicial attention. ''"S

In the remainder of this article, I will focus solely on the therapeutic jurisprudence/sanism-pretextuality overlap. I do this because I
believe it is absolutely essential that any and all analyses of mental
disability law jurisprudence-theoretical or doctrinal, empirical or

anecdotal-recognize the relationship between sanist stereotypes and
behaviors and pretextual testimony and court decisions. It is also
necessary that we acknowledge: (a) the way that mental disability
law jurisprudence develops out of our unconscious fears about mentally disabled persons; ' (b) the way that heuristics (cognitive simplifying devices) further drive this jurisprudence;' and (c) the teleolog-

Disability Law Jurisprudence, 11 BEHAVIORAL SCI. & L. 47 (1993).
21. See Michael L. Perlin, Pretexts and Mental Disability Law: The Case of Competency,
47 U. MIAI L. REV. 625 (1993) [hereinafter Perlin, Pretexts]; Michael L. Perlin, Morality
and Pretextuality, Psychiatry and Law: Of "Ordinary Common Sense," Heuristic Reasoning,
and Cognitive Dissonance, 19 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 131 (1991) [hereinafter
Perlin, Morality].
22. See generally Perlin, supra note 16, at 636. See also Michael L. Perlin, Tarasoff and
the Dilemma of the Dangerous Patient: New Directions for the 1990"s, 16 LAW & PSYCHOL.
REV. 29 (1992); Michael L. Perlin, Reading the Supreme Court's Tea Leaves: Predicting
Judicial Behavior in Civil and Criminal Right to Refuse Treatment Cases, 12 AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 37 (1991); Michael L. Perlin, Decoding Right to Refuse Treatment Law 16
INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 181 (1993) [hereinafter Perlin, Decoding].
23. John Petrila, Paternalism and the Unrealized Promise of Essays in Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HuM. RTs. 877 (1993) (review of ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC
JURISPRUDENCE (David B. Wexler & Bruce J. Wmick eds., 1991)).
24. Haycock, supra note 2, at 317 (emphasis added).
25. See, e.g., ichael L. Perlin, Unpacking the Myths: The Symbolism Mythology of
Insanity Defense Jurisprudence, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 599 (1989-90); MICHAEL L.
PERLIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE (1994).
26. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, Psychodynanics and the Insanity Defense: "Ordinary
Common Sense" and Heuristic Reasoning, 69 NEB. L. REV. 3 (1990) [hereinafter Perlin,
OCS]; Michael L. Perlin, Are Courts Competent to Decide Competency Questions? Stripping
the Facade From United States v. Charters, 38 U. KAN. L. REV. 957 (1990).
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ical basis of many of the cases that form the corpus of much of this
law. 7
What is meant by sanism and pretextuality?" Sanism refers to
the irrational prejudices that cause, and are reflected in, prevailing
social attitudes toward mentally disabled persons, and those so perceived. Although sanism infects our jurisprudence, our lawyering
practices, and our forensic practices, it is largely invisible and largely
socially acceptable. Sanism is based upon stereotype, myth, superstition and deindividualization. It is sustained and perpetuated by our
use of a false "ordinary common sense" and heuristic reasoning in
our unconscious responses to events in everyday life and the legal
process." Sanism's effects are especially pernicious in the ways that
social science is accepted or rejected in the formulation of a mental disability law jurisprudence. °
Pretextuality relates to the courts' acceptance (either implicit or
explicit) of testimonial dishonesty and their decisions to engage in
dishonest decisionmaking in mental disability law cases. This
pretextuality infects all participants in the system, breeds cynicism
and disrespect for the law, demeans participants and reinforces shoddy lawyering, blase judging and, at times, perjury.1
Both sanism and pretextuality need to be considered in any therapeutic jurisprudence inquiry. Unless we determine why the law has
developed as it has, it will make little difference if we determine
whether it is developing in a "therapeutically correct' way. In short,
even if the legal system were to come to grips with all therapeutic
jurisprudence issues in all aspects of mental disability law, these
additional inquiries are still required. While I am convinced that
therapeutic jurisprudence is an essential tool in the reconstruction of
mental disability law, if it is to truly illuminate the underlying system, we must place it in the proper social/political context. This
context examines why and how mental disability law has developed
and what conscious and unconscious motivations have contributed to
the law's development.3"

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

See Perlin & Dorfman, supra note 20.
See generally Perlin, supra note 16, at 630-31.
Perlin, supra note 20; Perlin, OCS, supra note 26.
See generally Perlin & Dorfman, supra note 20.
See generally Perlin, Pretexts, supra note 21; Perlin, Morality, supra note 21.
See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, Law as a Therapeutic and Anti-Therapeutic Agent,

Address Before Annual Conference of the Massachusetts Dep't of Mental Health's Division
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Thus, I believe that only through these perspectives can the "doctrinal abyss" that appears to define mental disability law be understood." Therapeutic jurisprudence-by forcing us to focus on the
therapeutic and antitherapeutic outcomes of court decisions, statutes,
rules and roles-illuminates the way that pretextuality and sanism
drive the mental disability law system.' The articles in this symposium remind us that scholars and researchers in this area partially fulfill the role of systemic archaeologists who continue to unearth new
discoveries that explain how and why the mental disability law system operates as it does.35

II. THIS SYMPOSiuM ISSUE
Each of the symposium papers reflects realities about both therapeutic jurisprudence and the mental disability law system. Richard
Barnum and Thomas Grisso's article provides examples illustrating

of Forensic Mental Health (May 28, 1992) (discussing, inter alia, Foucha v. Louisiana, 112
S. Ct. 1780 (1992) (rejecting the state's argument that it could indefinitely confine an
insanity acquittee who was no longer mentally ill) and Riggins v. Nevada, 112 S.Ct. 1810
(1992) (reversing a conviction in which a defendant's right to a fair trial was compromised
by the involuntary imposition of a high dosage of neuroleptic medication)); see generally 3
PERIN, supra note 1, § 15.25A (Supp. 1993) (discussing Foucha), and 2 id,§ 5.65 (Supp.
1993) (discussing Riggins). For a recent therapeutic jurisprudence reading of Riggins, see
Bruce J.Winick, Psychotropic Medication in the Crimina Trial Process: The Constitutional
and Therapeutic Implications of Riggins v. Nevada, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. . HUM. RTS. 637
(1993).
33. See, e.g., Michael L. Perlin, The Supreme Court, the Mentally Disabled Criminal
Defendant, and Symbolic Values: Random Decisions, Hidden Rationales, or "Doctrinal
Abyss?", 29 ARiZ. L. REV. 1 (1987).
34. For an especially rich example of the integration of therapeutic jurisprudence and
pretextuality theory, see Deborah A. Dorfman, Through a Therapeutic Jurisprudence Filter:
Fear and Pretextuality in Mental Disability Law, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J.HUM. RTS. 805 (1993).
35. In other recent important work, scholars are also applying therapeutic jurisprudence
theories to such areas as the federal sentencing guidelines which encourage defendants to
inform on co-defendants and friends to lessen their own sentences. See Kefi A. Gould,
Turning Rat and Doing Time for Uncharged,Dismissed or Acquitted Crimes: Do the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines Promote Respect for the Law?, 10 N.Y.L. ScH. . HUM. RTS. 835
(1993); see also Daniel W. Shuman, Making the World A Better Place Through Tort Law?:
Through the Therapeutic Jurisprudence Looking Glass, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. . HUM. RTS. 739
(1993)
(discussing the tort compensation system); Fred Cohen & Joel A.
Dvoskin, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Corrections: A Glimpse, 10 N.Y.L ScH. . HUM.
RT"S. 777 (1993) (discussing the impact of jail and prison reform litigation on institutional
conditions); Murray Levine, A Therapeutic JurisprudenceAnalysis of Mandated Reporting of
Child Maltreatment by Psychotherapists, 10 N.Y.L. ScH. J.HUM. RTs. 711 (1993) (discussing the impact of statutes making it mandatory for therapists to report evidence of child
abuse).
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that the application of procedures to determine competency to stand
trial in juvenile cases is often pretextual and that court ordered evaluations may be sought for reasons that have little to do with the actual competency inquiry.' Joel Haycock's piece reflects on the sanist
behavior of the Massachusetts legislature in passing a seemingly
innocuous financial recoupment law37 which has ominous therapeutic
and humanitarian implications. Joel Haycock, David Finkelman and
Helene Presskreischer's article strips the facade from the pretextual
level of representation often afforded to persons facing the involuntary civil commitment process." Ira Packer's essay shows the
pretextual nature of one of the strongest arguments in support of
"widening the net"39 in civil commitment (that stricter, behaviorbased criteria lead to the "criminalization" of the mentally iM).' Finally, both Wexler's general introduction to the concept of therapeutic jurisprudence and Grisso and Finkelman's introduction to these
papers demonstrate how each of these individual inquiries must be
reconsidered in light of both the entire mental disability law system4' and the legal system.42
An examination of each lead article is instructive. Barnum and
Grisso carefully analyze the discontinuities between section 15(a) and
section 15(f) of the Massachusetts juvenile justice act' in an attempt
to decipher the legislature's ambiguities and to offer an explanation
of an otherwise incoherent statute." Their analysis is careful and
convincing, in stark juxtaposition to the sloppily-drafted law they
analyze. The paper highlights the lack of attention legislatures generally devote to mental disability law questions, which is another reflection of the sanist way that mentally disabled persons, and their
legal problems, are marginalized. 4 Their careful review of commit36. See Infra text accompanying notes 43-48.
37. See infra text accompanying notes 80-83.
38. See infra text accompanying notes 54-61.
39. In re SL., 462 A.2d 1252, 1257 (NJ. 1983).
40. See infra text accompanying notes 76-79.
41. See Finkelman & Grisso, supra note 15.
42. See Wexler, Orientation, supra note 7.
43. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 123, § 15 (1992).
44. Barnum & Grisso, supra note 3, at 322-25.
45. This is especially ironic in light of the fact that the entire juvenile court system was
premised on a therapeutic basis, a premise that has failed miserably in the ensuing decades.
See, e.g., Barry C. Feld, The Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 75 MNN. L. REv. 691
(1991); Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense: Punishment,
Treatment, and the Difference Treatment Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV. 821 (1988); Charles
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ment of juveniles to determine their competency to stand trial" can
support an argument that the screening law has a pretextual basis, by

giving the court an apparent "objective" and disinterested basis (the
testimony of mental health professionals) on which to support (or,
perhaps, to "take the weight" of) the outcome it wished to reach.'
Their focus on courts' confusions demonstrates again the devaluation of these questions in the legal process.

Another issue that could benefit from an ongoing therapeutic
jurisprudence analysis is a consideration of the general level of slop-

piness that permeates mental health legislation and court opinions.
Statutes define mental illness and dangerousness using circular reasoning, and, in describing mental disability, employ terminology that
is antiquated. Judicial decisions conflate inapposite legal constructs,
and remain similarly wedded to arcane and dated terminology.'

However, poorly crafted mental health laws stand in stark contrast to other substantive areas of the law where Restatements and

American Law Institute drafts provide careful codifications." I doubt
that this is coincidental. Mental disability law has always been a poor

Springer, Rehabilitating the Juvenile Court, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 397
(1991). See generally In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14-16 (1967) (historical roots of juvenile

court jurisdiction).
46. Barnum & Grisso, supra note 3, at 322-32. The underlying issues will become even
more confounded in the future following the Supreme Court's decision in Godinez v. Moran,
113 S. Ct. 2680 (1993) (holding that the standard for assessing competency to enter guilty
pleas or waive counsel is no higher than to stand trial). See 3 PEtN, supra note 1, at
§§ 14.20A-14.21 (Supp. 1993) (criticizing Godinez).
47. Perlin, Morality, supra note 21, at 137 (discussing the pretextual nature of this exact
behavior). For a discussion on the ways that expert witnesses may shape their testimony to
comport with a judge's pre-existing position on a case, see Perlin, Pretexts, supra note 21,
at 653-58.
48. Barnum & Grisso, supra note 3, at 333-42.
49. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 721 (1972) (state statutes referred to institutions for the "feeble-minded"); see also, e.g., Addkinson v. State, 608 So. 2d 304, 308
(Miss. 1992) (psychiatrist characterized defendant as 'Iigh-end imbecile").
50. Perlin, Pretexts, supra note 21, at 679-80 (discussing courts' continued conflation and
misunderstanding of different tests for incompetency to stand trial and insanity).
51. The two exceptions are: MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01-.10 (Proposed Official Draft
1962) (insanity defense formulation) and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315-20 (1965)
(duty of psychotherapists to protect potential victims of acts by mentally disabled persons). It
is no coincidence that these are the only two areas of mental disability law in which lawyers are regularly available to litigate the issues in question. On the generally substandard
job done by counsel in this area, see Michael L. Perlin, Fatal Asswnption: A Critical
Evaluation of the Role of Counsel in Mental Disability Cases, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 39
(1992).
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stepchild of the law. For example, not one law school includes it as
part of the core curriculum. Mental disability law cases are never
favored assignments for trial judges. The civil commitment process is
subject to deformalization in a variety of ways 2 Much of the empirical literature that has developed around the question of the procedures needed to implement the constitutional right to refuse treatment
focuses on ways in which this stage can be de-legalized.5 3
This apathy toward and disinterest in precision and accuracy in

terminology is far from coincidental. Rather, it reflects the sanist
ways that both legislators and judges subordinate mental disability
law issues (a reflection and extension of their subordination of
mentally disabled persons). And given the frequency with which this
sort of subordination occurs, it is difficult to conceive how therapeutic ends could ever be met in such a system.
Other essays also uncover sanist and pretextual undercurrents in

mental disability law. Haycock, Finkelman and Presskreischer, for
example, begin by informing readers of the historical fact--well-

known to all who are familiar with this field but utterly and remark-

52. See, e.g., 1 PERIN, supra note 1, at § 3.15 (discussing the question of whether a judicial officer must conduct the involuntary civil commitment hearing); for an important
criticism of the use of nonjudicial hearing officers on the basis discussed here, see Serena
Stier & Kurt Stoebe, Continuing Studies Project: Involuntary Hospitalization of the Mentally
ill in Iowa: The Failure of the 1975 Legislation, 64 IOWA L. REV. 1284 (1979). On the
ways that more formalized civil commitment hearings might be therapeutic, see generally
John . Ensminger & Thomas Liguori, The Therapeutic Significance of the Civil Commitment
Hearing, 6 J.PSYCHIATRY & L. 5 (1978), reprinted in TJ, supra note 7, at 245.
53. See generally 2 PERLUN, supra note 1, at § 5.43; Perlin, Decoding, supra note 22, at
157 n.50. For typical analyses following the decision of Rivers v. Katz, 495 N.E.2d 337,
504 N.E.2d 74 (N.Y. 1986) (finding broad right to refuse antipsychotic drug treatment), see
generally Francine Cournos et al., A Comparison of Clinical and Judicial Procedures for
Reviewing Requests for Involuntary Medication in New York, 39 HOSP. & CoMMUN. PSYCHIATRY 851 (1988) (discussing how Rivers procedures neither delayed nor diminished the use
of involuntary medication in large state hospital); . Richard Ciccone et al., Right to Refuse
Treatment: Impact of Rivers v. Katz, 18 BuLL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 203, 214
(1990) (discussing Rivers "diminished responsiveness, increased expense, and decreased the
number of patients who had formal reviews of their refusal; in the process, the quality of
care for some patients was significantly reduced!); Karen McKinnon et al., Rivers in Practice: Clinicians' Assessments of Patients' Decision.Making Capacity, 40 Hosp. & COMMUNrTY
PSYCH!ATRY 1159 (1989) (discussing how even though doctors may find capacity assessments
"irrelevant' procedure may still be useful as it "encourages clinicians to discuss the proposed treatment with patients and to present information more effectively in court"); Francine
Coumnos et aL, Outcome of Involuntary Medication in a State Hospital System, 148 AM. .
PSYCHIATRY 489 (1991) (discussing how involuntary medications did not appear to enhance
insight or cooperation in cases of chronically severely ill patients).
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ably ignored by courts and legislatures--that "[r]eports on the failure.
. . to abide by procedural and substantive standards, and regular criticism of that failure .. ., have not appreciably advanced the practice
of rights-based civil commitment." They explain the shoddy job
traditionally performed by lawyers assigned to represent patients in
such hearings, and question assumptions about the role of lawyers in
the involuntary civil commitment process.55 They quote Paul
Appelbaum's rueful conclusion that "[A]t best.., we have a justice

system that is marginally interested in the civil commitment process[,] ''"e and note with painful poignancy the sadness of providing

commitment hearings in which courts mechanically allow patients to
make extemporaneous speeches protesting their commitments.' Additionally, they consider the therapeutic jurisprudence implications of
both an "adversarial" model and a "best interests" model, while offering a third option, a mediation model, as a potential alternative."

Although I ultimately disagree with the "mediation alternative" (my
opinion59 is that the authors' criticisms'

are far more persuasive

than the points they cite in its support), this does not diminish the
paper's value as a means of employing therapeutic jurisprudence to
expose the pretextual nature of the civil commitment system.6 '

Kathy Faulkner Yates' paper exposes sanism and pretextuality in
the mental disability law system in a very different context. She
54. Haycock et al., supra note 6, at 265-66.
55. Id. at 266; see generally Perlin, supra note 51.
56. Haycock et al., supra note 6. at 274 (quoting Paul S. Appelbaum, Civil Commitment
From a Systems Perspective, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 61, 66 (1992) (emphasis added)).
57. Haycock et al., supra note 6, at 277-78.
58. Id. at 269-87. See also Janet B. Abisch, Mediational Lawyering in the Civil Commitment Context: A Terapeutic Jurisprudence Solution to the Counsel Role Dilemma (manuscript-in-progress, on file with author).
59. For eight years, I was director of the New Jersey Division of Mental Health Advocacy, a state-level subcabinet office vested with the authority to provide representation in,
inter alia, involuntary civil commitment cases. See Michael L. Perlin, Mental Patient Advocacy by a Public Advocate, 54 PsYcmwAmc Q. 169 (1982).
60. For example, lack of potentially-adversarial counsel would 'Turthaer imbalance an
already imbalanced relationship"; that the disparity of bargaining positions would put patients
"at an even greater disadvantage than they are now." Haycock et aL, supra note 6, at 283.
On the ways that hospital staff can routinely manipulate such disparity in bargaining to
coerce patients into accepting voluntary commitment status (thus avoiding court hearings), see
Susan Reed & Dan Lewis, The Negotiation of Voluntary Admission in Chicago's State
Mental Hospitals, 18 J. PsYcIATRY & L. 137 (1990).
61. See, e.g., Haycock et al., supra note 6, at 278 ("[The patient's lawyers], in collusion
with the care-givers, disempower him or her and effectively thwart the establishment of a
voluntary treatment compact between the patient and mental health professionals.").
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examines constitutional decisions that shape the contours of the relationship between forensic evaluations, confidentiality, and the
Miranda doctrine,' relating them to other Supreme Court decisions
on competency to stand trials and competency to be executed.'
Her analysis leads to a series of recommendations on how to improve
the forensic testimony and the forensic evaluative process.'
In the course of her analysis--one within the core of therapeutic
jurisprudence envisioned by Wexler in his first collection6-Yates
shows how legal pretexts lead to antitherapeutic law. Although competency to stand trial appears to be grounded in constitutional doctrine, 6 research demonstrates that judges regularly and uncritically
accept conclusions of forensic experts.s This is so despite confusion
as to the meaning of the evidentiary standard that must be fulfilled
before acceptance of opinion testimony' and the actual substantive
terminology employed in competency determinations. 0 This confusion becomes even more troubling in light of evidence that
professionals' attitudes, orientations and political opinions have an
impact on their forensic evaluations,71 and that the likelihood of subjective bias "is enhanced when clinical factors are not clear-cut and
critical legal definitions are not present."'
Professional associations have failed to craft coherent and practical ethical guidelines,' adding another layer of pretextuality. Such
62. See, e.g., Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981); Powell v. Texas, 492 U.S. 680
(1989); Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402 (1987).

63. See, e.g., Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S.
715 (1972).
64. See, e.g., Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302

(1989).
65. Yates, supra note 5, at 362-68.
66. TJ, supra note 7, at 5-6.
67. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715

(1972).
68. See Yates, supra note 5, at 349-52 (discussing research reported in Stephen Golding,
Mental Health Professionals and the Courts: The Ethics of Expertise, 13 INT'L J.L. &
PSYCHIATRY 281 (1990), and in RONALD ROESCH & STEPHEN GOLDING, COMPET ENCY TO
STAND TRIAL (1980)).
69. See, e.g., Richard Rogers, Ethical Dilemmas in Forensic Evaluations, 5 BEHAVIORAL
Sc. & L. 149 (1987).
70. See, e.g., THOMAS GRisSO, EVALUATING COMPETECES: FORENSIC ASSESSMENTS AND
INSTRUMENTS (1986); Perlin, Pretexts, supra note 21.
71. See, e.g., Charles Ewing, Psychologists and Psychiatrists in Capital Sentencing:
Experts or Executioners?, 8 SOC'L ACTION & L. 67 (1982); Perlin, Pretexts, supra note 21.

72. Yates, supra note 5, at 356.
73. See id. at 352-56.
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an omission becomes more troubling in cases such as that of Dr.
James Grigson, who testified in defiance of all existing professional
ethical guidelines. 4 The problems are further exacerbated by evi-

dence that courts misuse competency evaluations, employing them to
inappropriately address issues of guilt and punishment, and erroneously conflate concepts of competency and responsibility.75 In short,

Yates employs therapeutic jurisprudence as a diagnostic tool to identify the malignant way that pretextuality poisons forensic and judicial
relationships, and offers a series of prescriptive measures in an attempt to eliminate bias in the forensic process.

Packer, in his paper, employs therapeutic jurisprudence methods
to assess the Western Massachusetts Court Clinic's system of evaluating the competency of criminal defendants to stand trial, NGRI
assessments and presentencing examinations,76 studying whether this

system has led to increased "back door" admissions to forensic psychiatric facilities.' He concludes that the data rejects the popular
"criminalization hypothesis" and that restrictions on commitment have

led and will lead to more mentally ill persons being arrested on a
variety of nuisance charges." Furthermore, Packer demonstrates how
the court clinic has actually resulted in a decrease in the psychiatric
hospitalization of mentally ill criminal defendants.'
Haycock's paper provides the ultimate unmasking of the

74. See 3 PERuN, supra note 1, § 17.13, at 529 n.270 (discussing testimony of Dr.
James Grigson and citing sources criticizing Dr. Grigson's testimony); see generally RONALD
ROSENAUM, TRAVELS wrrH "DR. DEATH" (1991).
75. Yates, supra note 5, at 357-58 (reporting on research in Howard Owens et al., The
Judge's View of Competency Evaluations, 13 BuLL. AM. AcAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 389
(1985)); see generally, Perlin, Pretexts, supra note 21.
76. Packer, supra note 4, at 291-92.
77. Id. at 293-96.
78. See, e.g., E. FULLER TORREY, NOWHEE To Go: THE TRAGIC ODYSSEY OF THE
HOMELS MENTALLY ILL 13-14 (1988).
79. Packer, supra note 4, at 294-96. Accord Thomas Arvanites, The Impact of State
Mental Hospital Deinstitutionalizationon Commitments for Incompetency to Stand Trial, 26
CRUAINOLOGY 307, 318 (1988); see generally 2 PERUN, supra note 1, § 6.24 n.632 (citing
sources) (Supp. 1993).
Packer's article also raises intriguing therapeutic jurisprudence questions about the use
(and avoidance) of the insanity defense in pretrial plea bargaining. See Packer, supra note 4,
at 296-97 (discussing the entry of guilty pleas to minor charges as a way of avoiding the
sometimes-draconian impact of a successful insanity defense). This lawyering gambit is an
important (and perhaps troubling) one that re-raises questions about the role of pretextuality
in the trial of insanity defense cases and is worthy of significant further attention. See
PERIN, supra note 25, at 417-45.
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pretextual charade of mental disability law. He discusses a Massachusetts statute'c which was enacted in response to "hoary anecdotes"
about the occasional patient who receives large Veterans Administration checks.81 The statute mandates that psychiatric patients who
have funds held in trust must "contribute toward the cost of any
counsel appointed" for that patient in an involuntary commitment or
medication refusal hearing.' Haycock exposes the cruelty and cynicism underlying the statutory enactment. Additionally, he demonstrates the unfairness of a law that "penalizes those psychiatric patients who exercise their constitutional rights, while rewarding those
compliant or simply needy individuals who decide to forgo legal
representation."'
Importantly, he disavows the characterization of this analysis as
one that derives from therapeutic jurisprudence. He notes that a recitation of the law's antitherapeutic consequences "did not carry much
weight with those who passed it' and that a rights-led attack was
needed to challenge it successfully.8 However, Haycock sells his
own analysis short. He states, persuasively and eloquently, that in
this case and in the vast majority of cases heretofore considered
through this means of analysis, a rights-based critique is, ultimately,
a therapeutic means of empowerment. His analysis of this shoddy
and petty law indicates that the use of therapeutic jurisprudence may
be the best means to erode the law's sanist and pretextual bases.
I.

CONCLUSION

One of the major forces that has shaped the development
therapeutic jurisprudence was a belief that the federal courts were
longer interested in theoretical or constitutional arguments made
behalf of mentally disabled persons, nor were they sympathetic

of
no
on
to

80. Haycock, supra note 2, at 306-10 (discussing MASS. GEN. L. ch. 123, § 18A
(1992)).
81. Id. at 307. He notes with absolute accuracy that this is the mental disability equivalent of stories, "so beloved by politicians about the welfare mother picking up her check in
a Cadillac." Id. I believe that this analogy is an enormously important one, and that this sort
of "vividness" heuristic, drives the mental disability law system in a variety of important
meretricious ways. See David Rosenhan, Psychological Realities and Judicial Policies, 10
STAN. LAW 10, 13-14 (1984); Marilyn Ford, The Role of Extralegal Factors in Jury Verdicts, 1 JUST. SYS. L 16, 23 (1984); Perlin, OCS, supra note 21, at 12-14.
82. MAsS. GEN. L. ch. 123, § 1SA (1992).
83. Haycock, supra note 2, at 308.
84. L at 309-10.
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(nor could they empathize with) the plight of such persons, especially
in an institutional context.' Therapeutic jurisprudence was seen as

an antidote judicial antipathy, as a palliative for the "sterility" of
mental disability law jurisprudence," and as a response to the lack
of any "social echo" in the current development of that law.'
The papers in this symposium advance the cause of therapeutic
jurisprudence and demonstrate its value in analyzing the forensic

mental health law system in Massachusetts. In addition, they illuminate two separate points. First, they demonstrate how the sanist and

pretextual ways that mental disability has developed in Massachusetts
reflect the sanist and pretextual bases that underlie the entire mental
disability system. Second, they indicate that any effort to explain that
system solely on the bases of legal doctrine will fail. In doing so,

they also force us to consider the issues of empowerment and
disempowermente' that confront the mental disability system, the
mental disability legal system, and the mental disability lawyering
system. The use of therapeutic jurisprudence to expose pretextuality
and strip the law's sanist facade will become a powerful tool that

85. See, e.g., TJ, supra note 7; Wexler, Orientation, supra note 7; David Wexler, Putting
Mental Health Into Mental Health Law: Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 16 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
27 (1992) [hereinafter Wexler, Mental Health]; Wexler, New Directions, supra note 17.
86. Wexler. Mental Health, supra note 85, at 29-31; John Petrila, Redefining Mental
Health Law: Thoughts on a New Agenda, 16 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 89, 89-92 (1992). I
generally concur with this pessimistic analysis of the way that the once "seeming-endless expansion of civil rights decisions involving the constitutional and civil rights of mentally disabled persons has come to a stuttering halt." See Perlin, supra note 14, at 1-2; see generally
Michael L. Perlin, State Constitutions and Statutes as Sources of Rights for the Mentally
Disabled: The Last Frontier?, 20 LOY. LA. L. REV. 1249 (1987). Yet, I believe that this
may overstate the case a bit.
An argument can be made that the Supreme Court's decisions in Riggins v. Nevada,
112 S. Ct. 1780 (1992), and Foucha v. Louisiana, 112 S. CL 1780 (1992), see generally
supra note 28, along with other more recent lower court decisions reinterpreting the "substantial professional judgment" standard of Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307 (1982), see
generally 2 PERiN, supra note 1, §§ 4.43, 7.18 (Supp. 1993) (discussing cases), and construing such prophylactic statutes as the Americans with Disabilities Act, see 42 U.S.C. §
12101-213 (1992), and the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, see 42 U.S.C. § 3601-31
(1988), see 2 PEnnu, supra note 1, §§ 6.44A-B, suggest that the death of doctrinal mental
disability law might be greatly overexaggerated. For a comprehensive, thoughtful and penetrating critique of the Youngberg professional judgment standard, see Susan Stefan, Leaving
Civil Rights to the "Experts": From Deference to Abdication Under the Professional Judgment Standard, 102 YALE LJ. 639 (1992)).
87. See Haycock, supra note 2, at 317.
88. Id. at 317-20; Haycock et al., supra note 6, at 277-86; see generally Petrila, supra
note 23.
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will serve as a means of attacking and uprooting "the we/they distinction that has traditionally plagued and stigmatized the mentally
disabled."' As I have recently suggested elsewhere, "that result will
be therapeutic: for the legal system, for the development of mental
disability law, and ultimately, for all of us."'

89. Wexler, New Directions, supra note 17, at 776.
90. Perlh, supra note 16, at 636.

